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ABSTRACT
This paper proposes MP3, the second privacy-preserving
presence protocol that leaks no information about the graph
structure of the social network. Several cryptographic tech-
niques are applied to improve the existing DP5 protocol—
the first privacy-preserving presence protocol—while main-
taining the same level of privacy. The key contribution of
this paper is the use of a dynamic broadcast encryption
scheme to reduce the size of the presence database. This en-
ables cheaper registration and lookup required for the proto-
col. As compared to DP5, MP3 requires on the order of ten
times less bandwidth of the servers during registration, and
requires on the order of two times less bandwidth for lookup,
for a small number of users (N = 10000). Furthermore,
these savings asymptotically increase with the number of
users. The client-side latency is also improved significantly
in MP3, as compared with DP5. We provide an evaluation
of the performance and scalability of both protocols.
1. INTRODUCTION
An often overlooked requirement of providing secure com-
munication is protecting the metadata of the users. Due
to the recent threat and concern of government surveillance
and collection of user data [1], an increasing number of ser-
vices have appeared with the goal of protecting users’ pri-
vacy from the provider of the service. A common approach is
end-to-end secure messaging, which is currently employed in
services such as Apple’s iMessage, Open Whisper Systems’
Signal Protocol, and Facebook’s Messenger [2–4]. Secure
messaging hides the content of the conversation from the
provider by using strong cryptographic techniques, but that
is not enough as the metadata (who is contacting whom,
when are they contacting each other, etc.) of the conversa-
tion is still known to the service provider.
A critical part of secure messaging is presence, i.e., know-
ing when a friend is online. Even though the secure mes-
saging providers do not have access to the plaintext conver-
sation, they still keep track of the set of friends for every
user in order to run their service. This means that these
services know the entire graph structure of their social net-
work as well as the presence status of every user. To have a
truly private communication platform, the communication
metadata must also be protected.
To address this issue Borisov, Danezis, and Goldberg pro-
posed DP5—the Daghstul Privacy Preserving Presence Pro-
tocol P—the first privacy-preserving protocol to leak no in-
formation about the social graph to third parties and limit
the information retained by the service itself [5]. DP5 is a
private presence protocol that allows the users to see the on-
line status of their friends in a completely private manner.
DP5 makes use of Private Information Retrieval (PIR) [6]
for querying the service for a given user’s buddy’s presence.
The major challenge with DP5 is its scalability (or lack
thereof). The presence database of DP5 grows much more
rapidly than the number of users of the service. This creates
a very expensive service for even a small number of users.
To correct this issue, we propose MP3—the Minnesota Pri-
vate Presence Protocol—as an improvement to DP5. MP3
significantly reduces the size of the presence database by
leveraging a dynamic broadcast encryption scheme [7]. As
a result, MP3 is significantly cheaper to run for even a rel-
atively modest user base, with savings that increase as the
number of users scales up.
Key Contributions. We improve the existing DP5 pro-
tocol by using a dynamic broadcast encryption scheme, while
maintaining the same level of privacy. This enables a signifi-
cant reduction in the size of the presence database, allowing
much cheaper registration and lookup queries in the context
of the bandwidth required from both a client and server-side
perspective in the proposed MP3 protocol. The user-facing
latency of MP3 is also an order of magnitude less than that
of DP5.
This paper is organized as follows: Section 2 describes
the background, goals, and related work pertaining to the
MP3 protocol, Section 3 presents a detailed description of
the MP3 protocol, and Section 4 analyzes the performance
of MP3 and compares it to that of DP5.
2. BACKGROUND
The primary functionality of a private presence protocol
is to allow for the registration of one’s online presence and
to query the presence status of one’s buddies. Some auxil-
iary functionality is needed for MP3 and DP5 to achieve a
completely private presence protocol. In our design, a user’s
buddies are a one way relationship, i.e., Alice follows Bob,
but Bob does not necessarily need to follow Alice. Alice
controls who may follow her by giving them explicit access
(by sharing a key out-of-band) and has the ability to revoke
that access at any time.
2.1 DP5 Overview
Since our design shares many characteristics with DP5, we
give a brief overview of the protocol here. DP5 makes use
of Private Information Retrieval (PIR), in which a database
is distributed to several servers so that a user can query the
servers to retrieve a specific record without revealing which
ar
X
iv
:1
60
9.
02
98
7v
1 
 [c
s.C
R]
  1
0 S
ep
 20
16
record they retrieve. Given this functionality, a “trivial”
private presence protocol would have each user A with nA
friends encrypt nA presence records recording their status
(and possibly other information, such as a contact address),
with the shared key for each friend, and periodically upload
this information to a presence database. When A’s friend
B wants to check on A’s status, they would query the cur-
rent database (using PIR) for the presence records encrypted
under the symmetric key A shares with B. To hide infor-
mation about the social graph, each user would need to pad
the number of presence records uploaded per period to some
maximum value denoted as Nfmax. Since the server compu-
tational costs of PIR scale linearly in the size of the database
(and the bandwidth costs also increase, though sub-linearly)
this protocol would result in a quadratic-size database.
To combat this problem, in DP5 the presence service is
split into two asymmetric services. The primary, short-term
service is used to register and query presence of users with
the precision of short (on the order of 5 minute) windows.
The secondary service is the long-term database, which is
used to provide metadata for querying during the short-
term. The long-term database also provides friend regis-
tration and revocation with the precision of long (on the
order of 24 hour) windows. As in the “trivial” protocol, it
is assumed that users share a unique secret with each of
their friends (most probably through a Diffie-Hellman key
exchange [8]). In order to not leak information about how
many friends a given user has DP5 (and MP3) defines the
limit of Nfmax on the number of friends a user may have.
In each period of the long-term database, a user (let’s say
Alice) of DP5 will upload her presence to the registration
mechanism of DP5. This is referred to as Alice’s long-term
presence record. This record is actually several records, one
for each of Alice’s friends, padded to the limit on the number
of friends a user may have. Usually, this limit will be on the
order of the number of users of the service, meaning the long-
term presence database scales almost with the square of the
number of users, which in turn increases the amount of band-
width and CPU this service requires from both client and
server-side perspectives. These long-term presence records
contain an ephemeral symmetric encryption key and signa-
ture verfication key that Alice then uses to encrypt and sign
a single presence record for any short-term period in which
she is online, which is uploaded to the short-term presence
database. Thus the short-term database, which is queried
more often, grows only linearly with the number of online
users.
We address the issue of scaling in the long-term database
by reducing the number of records Alice uploads in each
long-term database to just a single record, similar to the
short-term database, by using a dynamic broadcast encryp-
tion scheme.
2.2 Threat Model
We make standard assumptions about the users and ad-
versaries of MP3. They are real world adversaries with com-
mon capabilities.
• We assume that honest users’ systems are secure and
not compromised. We also assume that honest servers
can maintain secrecy and integrity. Our design main-
tains forward secrecy and does not require servers to
store any long-term secrets.
• We allow the adversary to be an observer or a dishon-
est user of the system, and we assume they have not
made any recent breakthrough in computational cryp-
tographic assumptions, and assume that they cannot
distinguish between different ciphertexts (IND-CPA).
More detailed cryptographic assumptions are described
in Section 3.
• Our security properties are under the covert model,
i.e., adversaries will not act dishonestly if it would
cause them to be detected and identified.
• Our protocol uses a robust information-theoretic PIR
(IT-PIR) scheme [9] that requires multiple servers. This
scheme requires that at least one server does not col-
lude. This is described in more detail in Section 3.1.3.
2.3 Security Goals
The primary goal of MP3 is to provide presence informa-
tion in a private manner. Here we describe the goals required
for a private presence service.
Privacy of presence and auxiliary data. The pres-
ence status of a user and their auxiliary data should be avail-
able to only the explicit friends of that user.
Integrity of presence and auxiliary data. The friends
of Alice should not accept the presence and auxiliary data
unless it was submitted by Alice.
Unlinkability of sessions. A user should not be able
to be linked between uses of MP3. The infrastructure and
non-friend users should not be able to link the presence of
another user between epochs.
Privacy of the social graph. No information about
the social graph of a user should be revealed to any other
party of MP3. More specifically, friends should not learn
about other friends and the infrastructure should not learn
any new information about a user.
Forward/Backward secure. Any compromised keys
should not reveal past or future information that is secured
with previous or future keys.
Auditable All operations performed by the infrastruc-
ture should be auditable. A user should detect when their
friend registration or presence registration has not been per-
formed honestly by the service provider.
Support for anonymous channels. The protocol should
not require any identifying information for operation. The
use of an anonymous channel should only enhance the pri-
vacy of the system, and MP3 will not compromise the anonymity
of the user.
Lastly, DP5 claims indistinguishably of offline status and
revocation. We show in Section 5.2 that there are severe
limitations on the extent to which a presence protocol can
conceal revocation status. As a result, we do not try to
maintain this goal, which allows us our approach.
2.4 Related Work
Excluding DP5, there does not exist any previous work
addressing the privacy of presence and social graphs. Dis-
sent [10] and Riposte [11] offer anonymous micro-blogging
services; these systems are similar to private presence in that
posting a micro-blog implies the author was online. Dis-
sent is based on a DC-net with a client-server architecture.
Clients in Dissent must form a group to post anonymous
messages for each other using distrusted servers. Dissent
provides anonymity within a static group. Riposte utilizes
a novel private database writing mechanism based on tech-
niques of PIR. Both of these systems have high latency when
dealing with large anonymity sets and are not concerned
with the privacy of the social graph.
3. THE MP3 PROTOCOL
At a high level, the purpose of MP3 is to provide an effi-
cient presence mechanism that leaks no information to any
third-party about the graph structure of the social network
(i.e., who is friends with whom). At this level, a user (call
her Alice) will register her presence with the registration
mechanism of MP3; one of her friends (call him Bob) can
then query for Alice’s presence with the lookup mechanism
of MP3, and retrieve the status of Alice’s presence. By em-
ploying several cryptographic techniques, this process can
be carried out without leaking any information.
For the remainder of this paper, denote Alice (labeled a)
as a user that is registering her presence, and Bob (labeled
b) as a user that is querying for Alice’s presence.
3.1 Overview
To register her presence, Alice must encrypt a presence
record and register it through the registration mechanism
of MP3. This record must be encrypted in such a manner
that only the set of Alice’s friends can decrypt it. For Bob
to query, or lookup, the presence of Alice, he must request
the record from the lookup mechanism of MP3 that was
uploaded by Alice. If this lookup was done na¨ıvely, the
lookup mechanism would learn that Bob is requesting Alice’s
presence record. To circumvent this, the lookups are done
using Private Information Retrieval (PIR). The registration
mechanism of MP3 uses a single registration server, and the
lookup mechanism is a set of Nlookup PIR lookup servers.
The use of PIR requires time to be divided into discrete
units, referred to as epochs. At the end of an epoch, the
registration mechanism of MP3 compiles all presence records
registered during that epoch and creates a PIR database.
This database (and the metadata associated with it) is then
sent to each of the Nlookup lookup servers. The specifics of
PIR are detailed in Section 3.1.3.
In order for Bob to know which record to request from the
lookup mechanism, Alice and Bob must have a shared iden-
tifier that is included in Alice’s presence record. In the event
that an adversary learns this identifier, they can now query
for Alice’s presence indefinitely. To circumvent this, long-
term and short-term epochs are employed, and by congru-
ence, different sets of a single registration server and Nlookup
PIR lookup servers are employed for long-term epochs and
short-term epochs. Ephemeral epoch keys are also employed
such that new epoch keys are generated every long-term
epoch. Thus, in the event of a compromise of these keys,
only the presences for that epoch are compromised, and fu-
ture epochs are safe as new keys are generated in the next
long-term epoch.
3.1.1 Primitives
It is assumed that everyone participating in MP3 shares
a set of known cryptographic primitives. Let G1 and G2 be
two additive (written multiplicatively) cyclic groups of prime
order p and let GT be a multiplicative cyclic group also of
prime order p. Denote Zp as the ring of integers modulo p.
An efficiently computable asymmetric pairing [12] defined by
the map e : G1×G2 → GT is known such that for generators
g1 ∈ G1, g2 ∈ G2, and ∀u, v ∈ Zp:
e(gu1 , g
v
2 ) = e(g1, g2)
uv ∈ GT
The discrete logarithm problem (DLP), computational Diffie-
Hellman problem (CDH), and the computational co-Diffie-
Hellman problem (co-DHP or co-CDH) are assumed hard for
G1 and G2. It is also assumed that we have a type 3 pairing
so that efficiently computable isomorphisms from G1 → G2
and G2 → G1 do not exist [13].
Let T be the set of valid long-term epoch timestamps and
τ be the set of valid short-term epoch timestamps. MP3
also makes use of the following:
• PRFK : τ → {0, 1}α, a keyed pseudorandom func-
tion where K ∈ {0, 1}β that maps a short-term epoch
timestamp to bit-strings of length α.
• H0 : τ → G2, an efficiently computable hash function
that maps short-term epoch timestamps to elements
of G2.
• H1 : G1 → {0, 1}β , an efficiently computable hash
function that maps elements of G1 to bit-strings of
length β; that is, keys in the pseudorandom function.
• H2 : {0, 1}δ → {0, 1}`, an efficiently computable hash
function that maps bit-strings of length δ to bit-strings
of length `. δ is the length of a long-term public key
and ` is the length of an identifier.
• H3 : GT → {0, 1}`, an efficiently computable hash
function that maps elements of GT to bit-strings of
length `. Here again, ` is the length of an identifier.
• AEADIVK (h,m), an authenticated encryption function
where K ∈ {0, 1}α (not to be mistaken for the key in
the PRF), m is the message, and h is an unencrypted
header used to derive a message authentication code
(MAC). When h = ε, the empty string, it will be left
out.
3.1.2 Epoch Specifics
Long-term epochs are meant to last on the order of a day,
while short-term epochs are meant to last on the order of
several minutes. The purpose of the long-term epoch is for
a user to query the long-term lookup servers for their bud-
dies’ ephemeral epoch keys. The purpose of the short-term
epoch is to enable a user to query for their buddies’ presence.
The ephemeral epoch keys are a tuple containing a buddy’s
shared identifier for the next long-term epoch and the shared
identifier for the set of current1 short-term epochs. Define
the following notation:
• Tj ∈ T , the j’th long-term epoch.
• ti ∈ τ , the i’th short-term epoch.
• P ja , the long-term identifier for the j’th long-term epoch
for buddy Alice; call this Alice’s long-term public key.
• pja, the short-term identifier for all short-term epochs
during the j’th long-term epoch; call this Alice’s public
presence key.
1current as in all short-term epochs during this long-term
epoch
If Bob were to query the lookup servers during Tj for
his buddy Alice (using Alice’s long-term public key, P ja ,
that he previously queried during epoch Tj−1), he would
receive Alice’s encrypted epoch keys and decrypt them to
get (P j+1a , p
j+1
a ). Because of this setup, Bob (and the rest
of Alice’s buddies) will learn both her long-term public key
and public presence key for a given epoch. This means that
there is nothing stopping one of Alice’s buddies from up-
loading a record as her. To prevent this, we employ two
signature schemes, one for long-term presence records and
another for short-term presence records. Thus, all of Alice’s
friends can be confident that the record they received from
MP3’s lookup mechanism can only belong to Alice. During
long-term epochs, we employ an elliptic curve digital signa-
ture [14], specifically using the Edwards-curve Digital Sig-
nature Algorithm (EdDSA), we make use of the reference
implementation, Ed25519 [15]. During short-term epochs,
the Boneh-Lynn-Shacham (BLS) [16] signature scheme is
employed.
Long-term epochs are essentially a broadcast encryption
scheme [17]. Briefly, broadcast encryption is a mechanism
in which a broadcast manager distributes some sort of en-
crypted message to a set of known users who are qualified to
decrypt the message, while maintaining the ability to revoke
and add other users to this set at any time. In the context of
MP3’s long-term epoch, every user is a broadcast manager,
their encrypted message is their epoch keys, and the set of
qualified users is their friends. We implement the long-term
epoch using a dynamic broadcast encryption scheme with
constant-size ciphertexts and decryption keys [7].
Short-term epochs are solely for getting your buddies’ cur-
rent presence. The precision in this is determined by the
length of the short-term epoch. Just the existence of a short-
term record for your buddies implies that they are online,
but they may wish to include a presence message includ-
ing information such as their encryption public key, how to
make contact with them, etc. Denote mia as the presence
message of Alice for epoch ti.
3.1.3 Private Information Retrieval
In order to not reveal which presence records are being re-
trieved when a user performs a lookup, PIR is used. Specif-
ically, information-theoretic PIR (IT-PIR), which requires
multiple (Nlookup) PIR lookup servers. IT-PIR is used over
computational PIR (C-PIR) due to its large speed improve-
ment. In the event C-PIR was used, only a single lookup
server would be required. In IT-PIR, a user splits their query
across each of Nlookup lookup servers, and combines the re-
sponses from all the servers to retrieve the requested data.
We implement the same hash based PIR protocol [6,9,18,19]
as in DP5, where the database is a hash table storing a map
of 〈key,value〉 pairs. For example, when querying for Alice,
the key is an identifier of length ` and the value is the Al-
ice’s presence record. If we have n presence records, each of
length s (in bytes) at an epoch change, we create r = d√ns e
buckets. The expected value of the size of each bucket is n
r
records and probabilistically no more than n
r
+
√
n
r
.
To determine the hash function used to hash the keys for
the database in such a way that the size of the database
is minimized, ten random keys for a PRF Π(r) with image
{1, . . . , r} are selected, using each to hash all the presence
records. The key that yields the smallest largest bucket is
used to define the hash function. All buckets are padded
to the size of this smallest largest bucket. This operation is
done by the registration server at the end of every epoch,
after which, the resulting databases are then sent off to each
lookup server.
3.2 Setup
To participate in MP3, Alice randomly selects Ga ∈ G1,
Ha ∈ G2, and γa ∈ Zp. She then stores the tuple (Ga, Ha, γa)
as her manager key.
For every friend f of Alice, she randomly selects xaf ∈
Zp and stores it. She then derives the following from her
manager key:
Aaf = G
xaf
γa+xaf
a Baf = H
1
γa+xaf
a
The tuple (xaf , Aaf , Baf ) is then shared out-of-band with
friend f as their decryption key (associated with Alice) along
with her current long-term public key, P ja .
3.3 Long-term Epoch
3.3.1 Registration
To register for epoch Tj , Alice must register during epoch
Tj−1. To begin, Alice generates a new long-term public-
private key pair as (P ja , Y
j
a ) where Y
j
a is a randomly se-
lected private key and P ja is its associated point on Ed25519.
She also generates a new public-private presence key pair as
(pja, y
j
a), where y
j
a ∈ Zp and pja = gy
j
a
1 , g1 ∈ G1.
During a long-term epoch, Alice has the opportunity to
revoke a certain number of her buddies. Denote this as Nrev
and note that it is a parameter of the MP3 protocol and
constant for all users. Using the stored x values from the
decryption keys of the set of buddies Alice wishes to revoke
and her manager key, she computes Rja and updates her
manager key as follows:
Algorithm 1 Compute Rja and update Manager Key
1: R = {xr | r = 0, 1, . . . , Nrev} // x values to revoke
2: Rja := ε
3: for each x ∈ R do
4: B := H
1
γa+x
a
5: Rja := R
j
a ‖ x ‖B
6: Ha := B
7: end for
Revocations are permanent, meaning if Alice would like
to “re-friend” a previously revoked buddy, she would have to
share a new decryption key with them using the construction
in Section 3.2. In the event that Alice would like to revoke
less than Nrev buddies, she can just pad R
j
a with random
buddies up to Nrev.
Alice then selects a random κ ∈ Zp and computes the
following:
Cja1 = G
κγa
a , C
j
a2 = H
κ
a , K
j
a = e(Ga, Ha)
κ
She then encrypts her epoch keys as:
Cja = AEAD
j
K
j
a
(P j−1a ‖Rja ‖ Cja1 ‖ Cja2, P ja ‖ pja)
Finally, she creates the signature:
Sja = signY j−1a
(P j−1a ‖Rja ‖ Cja1 ‖ Cja2 ‖ Cja)
Alice then uploads P j−1a ‖ Rja ‖ Cja1 ‖ Cja2 ‖ Cja ‖ Sja to the
long-term registration server.
Upon receiving Alice’s record, the long-term registration
server will first verify Sja with the record using P
j−1
a . If the
signature is valid, the server will compute IDja = H2(P
j−1
a ),
and store 〈IDja, Rja ‖ Cja1 ‖ Cja2 ‖ Cja ‖ Sja〉.
3.3.2 Lookup
To lookup Alice’s presence for epoch Tj , Bob first re-
quests the metadata associated with the databases from
each lookup server. Since all lookup servers have the same
database, the metadata should be the same, but in the event
that some of the servers are dishonest, he takes the majority
of the received metadata. The metadata contains informa-
tion about the number of buckets and size of the buckets. He
then computes IDja = H2(P
j−1
a ), and builds a PIR request
using the metadata for IDja (and the rest of his buddies),
splits his query across the Nlookup long-term lookup servers,
combines the responses2 from each server and retrieves:
Rja ‖ Cja1 ‖ Cja2 ‖ Cja ‖ Sja
Bob then verifies the signature with P j−1a (to be absolutely
certain that the record is from Alice). If the signature is
invalid, he does not complete the steps outlined in the re-
mainder of this section.
Bob updates his decryption key as follows:
Algorithm 2 Update Decryption Key
1: R′ = {(xr, Br) | r = 0, 1, . . . , Nrev} // from Rja
2: for each (x,B) ∈ R′ do
3: Bab :=
(
B
Bab
) 1
xab−x
4: end for
In the event that Bob is in R′, he cannot do the computa-
tion on line 3 as he would try to compute 1/0. If he chose to
not update his Bab, he would not be able to properly decrypt
Cja, thus he is permanently revoked from Alice’s buddy list.
Assuming Bob has not been revoked, he then computes3:
e(Cja1, Bab) · e(Aab, Cja2)
= e(Gκγaa , H
1
γa+xab
a ) · e(G
xab
γa+xab , Hκa )
= e(Ga, Ha)
κγa
γa+xab · e(Ga, Ha)
xbκ
γa+xab
= e(Ga, Ha)
κγa+κxab
γa+xab
= e(Ga, Ha)
κ = Kja
and finally uses Kja to decrypt C
j
a retrieving P
j
a and p
j
a.
To prevent the lookup mechanism of MP3 from learning
how many buddies Bob has, he must make a lookup for
2the PIR protocol we use [9] supports detection of malicious
servers. The presence data is reconstructable when only t+2
servers are honest, and t is the privacy level. Any collusion
of upto t servers learns no information about the presence
data.
3This computation has been simplified to the case in which
Alice has not revoked anyone and thus not updated her man-
ager key and Bob has not updated his decryption key. In
the case that the keys have been updated, the exponents
of the group elements will be the same, but the group el-
ements themselves will be different, so this computation is
equivalent.
Nfmax buddies. Note that Nfmax is another parameter of the
protocol and is constant for all users. If Bob has less than
Nfmax buddies, he pads his request with random IDs up to
Nfmax.
3.4 Short-term Epoch
3.4.1 Registration
To register for epoch ti, Alice must register during ti−1.
Assume that epoch ti is during epoch Tj . To begin, Alice
encrypts her presence message, mia as follows:
kia = PRFH1(pja)
(ti) c
i
a = AEAD
i
kia
(mia)
She then computes the unforgeable signature:
sia = H0(ti)
yja
Alice then uploads cia ‖ sia to the short-term registration
server.
Upon receiving Alice’s record, the short-term registration
server will compute idia = H3(e(g1, s
i
a)), and store 〈idia, cia〉.
3.4.2 Lookup
To lookup Alice’s presence for epoch ti, Bob requests the
metadata associated with the short-term databases in the
same manner as in the long-term epoch, then computes
idia = H3(e(p
j
a, H0(ti)) which is equivalent to the regis-
tration server’s computation of H3(e(g1, s
i
a)) by the prop-
erties of pairings. He then builds a PIR request for idia
(and the rest of his buddies), splits his query across Nlookup
short-term lookup servers, combines the responses from each
server and retrieves cia. Bob can be absolutely certain that
cia is from Alice due to the unforgeable signature s
i
a.
Bob can then compute kia = PRFH1(pja)
(ti) and decrypt c
i
a
retrieving mia. The decryption being successful implies that
Alice is online during epoch ti. As in the long-term epoch,
in order to not leak information of how many buddies Bob
has, he must pad his lookup to Nfmax ids.
3.5 Remarks
3.5.1 Details
Recall the parameters Nlookup, Nfmax, and Nrev. Denote
N as the number of users. Long-term epochs should last on
the order of a day and short-term epochs on the order of
several minutes. The length of a short-term epoch defines
the precision in querying for a given user’s buddies’ current
presence. The length of a long-term epoch defines how often
buddies can be revoked. The performance of the operations
of both epochs is comparable.
The client-side space complexity for long-term registration
is Θ(Nrev) and for short-term registrations is Θ(1). Both
the long-term and short-term databases store N records.
As described in Section 3.1.3, the databases are stored as a
map of 〈key,value〉 pairs. Recall that we create r = d√ns e
buckets where n is the number of records and s is the length
of a record. Each long-term presence record is inherently
larger than a short-term presence record. Also recall that
the upper bound of bucket size is probabilistically no more
than n
r
+
√
n
r
. Because of the asymmetry in record lengths
between short-term and long-term epochs, the number of
buckets will be greater and the number of records per bucket
will be less in a long-term database, than that of the short-
term database. This makes the lookup cost in the long-term
database slightly more than that of the short-term.
3.5.2 Improvements to DP5
In DP5, the server-side space complexity for long-term
registration is Θ(N · Nfmax), because long-term database
stores N ·Nfmax records. This is due to Alice needing to up-
load a single presence record for each of her buddies. We im-
prove the long-term registration by using a dynamic broad-
cast encryption scheme to require Alice to only upload a sin-
gle presence record that all of her buddies query, reducing
the space complexity to Θ(N · Nrev). We leave the short-
term epoch of DP5 unchanged as it is already inexpensive.
Our improvement greatly reduces the size of the long-term
database by removing the scaling with Nfmax for long-term
presence records, and as such reduces the required band-
width to run the service for both registration and lookup.
Note that DP5 bandwidth costs do not rely on Nrev, but
that is a non-issue, as argued in Section 5.1.
3.5.3 Skipping Epochs
In order to maintain privacy and not leak or expose any
information, users have to follow a strict set of guidelines
regarding epochs. It may often be the case that a user misses
certain epochs. Due to short-term epochs being solely for
retrieving the presence status for a users’ buddies, it will
often be the case that many users do not participate in every
short-term epoch. Users can choose how often they wish
to participate in short-term epochs based on non-sensitive
information (such as network availability), but cannot be
based on information from or related to previous epochs.
Otherwise, an adversary could create a timing attack and
learn information about a given user’s buddies.
In the case of long-term epochs, skipping epochs creates a
problem in that short-term queries rely on information from
the previous long-term epoch. MP3 assumes that all users
have queried all long-term databases in order to have the
most recent long-term public keys for their buddies. To miti-
gate this, a user must query all previous long-term databases
in order to retrieve the most recent long-term public keys for
their buddies. A user cannot just query long-term databases
until they find the buddy in question as the lookup mecha-
nism or an observer would then learn that the last time this
buddy was online was the last epoch the user queried. This
process must be carried out for all long-term lookups, not
just when one of your buddies misses an epoch as to not leak
any information.
As this operation becomes very expensive as the length of
time an MP3 service is running, we place a bound on how
many long-term databases are stored (on the order of 30
days). This requires all users to participate in the long-term
epoch at least once within this bound, or in the case that
this is impossible, share their most recent long-term public
key with all their buddies out-of-band to get back on MP3.
4. PERFORMANCE
4.1 Implementation
The MP3 protocol is built on top of HTTP. The core cryp-
tography relies on OpenSSL for AES [20] and SHA-256 [21],
RELIC [22] for pairing-friendly curves, Percy++ [23] for
PIR, and Ed25519 for non-group signatures. The server-
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Figure 1: Long-term databases sizes for MP3 and
DP5, Nrev = 1
side networking relies on the Twisted network programming
framework.
The groups G1, G2, and GT are defined by the Optimal
Ate pairing over a 256-bit Barreto-Naehrig curve. We use
Andrew Moon’s implementation4 of Ed25519 for deriving
long-term public/private keys and long-term epoch signa-
tures. AEAD is implemented using AES in Galois/Counter
Mode (GCM) [24]. The PRF and hash functions are impl-
mented using SHA-256. All client-side network interactions
are encoded as HTTP requests using the grequests5 mod-
ule. The server-side networking is built using the Twisted
Web framework. In all, our MP3 library is implemented in
4500 lines of C++ and 1400 lines of Python 2.7.
4.2 Experiments
To evaluate the performance of MP3 vs. DP5, we sim-
ulated both protocols in an event-driven manner with the
number of users ranging from 100 to 2000 clients. To sim-
ulate the worst-case scenario, we had all clients perform
registration and lookup for all epochs. We staggered when
clients began an operation in order to avoid the thundering
4https://github.com/floodyberry/ed25519-donna
5https://github.com/kennethreitz/grequests
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Figure 2: Overall user-facing latency comparing MP3 and DP5, including RTT.
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Figure 3: All bandwidths for lookup servers, comparing MP3 and DP5. All data is for a single epoch.
Nfmax = 100, Nrev = 1.
herd problem. All simulations were run across several 3.4
GHz Haswell i7 machines, all with 32 GB of RAM. In each
setup, clients were evenly spread across 8 machines, a single
machine was used for both short-term and long-term reg-
istration, and each short-term and long-term lookup server
received its own machine. Nlookup was held fixed at 3 for
all setups and both protocols. The equivalent of 6 months
or 180 days (with 24-hour long-term epochs and 5 minute
short-term epochs) of execution were simulated in all setups.
For both MP3 and DP5, the most expensive components are
the PIR lookup servers, both from a CPU and bandwidth
point of view.
The main bottleneck with DP5 is the long-term lookup
server due to the size of the database scaling with Nfmax.
Figure 1 compares the long-term database sizes for MP3
and DP5, when the number of users is varied and Nfmax is
fixed, and when Nfmax is varied and the number of users
is fixed. Note that the database size for DP5 is inherently
larger in both plots, and specifically grows rapidly when
varying Nfmax, while the database size for MP3 is constant.
The user-facing latency for both protocols is summarized
in Figure 2. Both protocols were simulated with 1000 users
and Nfmax = 100; for MP3, Nrev = 1. Increasing Nrev for
MP3 will have no effect on the latency, so this comparison
is valid. As seen in Figure 2a, the long-term registration
latency between the two protocols is comparable as the op-
eration for storing presence records doesn’t change with the
number of records uploaded by a user. As seen in Figre
2b, the long-term lookup latency is an order of magnitude
higher for DP5. This is due to less records being processed
by the lookup servers in MP3. The number of records in
a DP5 long-term database scales with Θ(N · Nfmax), while
the number of records in an MP3 long-term database only
scales with Θ(N) for MP3. The short-term registration and
lookup for both protocols were nearly identical, as expected.
Table 1: Client bandwidth costs for a single epoch
and comparison to common websites. N = 1000,
Nfmax = 100, Nrev = 1.
MP3 DP5 twitter.com amazon.com
IN
short-term 49 KB 48 KB
3.3 MB 4.3 MB
long-term 720 KB 1122 KB
OUT
short-term 184 B 184 B
long-term 160 KB 680 KB
The overall client-side bandwidth is summarized in Table
1. The total bandwidth for a long-term epoch is significantly
less for MP3 (880 KB) than that of DP5 (1802 KB) and com-
pared with commonly visited websites such as twitter.com
(3.3 MB) and amazon.com (4.3 MB), the bandwidth costs
are very reasonable. As expected, the bandwidth costs in the
short-term are nearly identical for both protocols, and much
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Figure 4: Overall bandwidth for registration servers, comparing MP3 and DP5. All data is for a single epoch.
Nfmax = 100, Nrev = 1.
smaller (49.2 KB) than either of twitter.com or amazon.com.
Between both protocols, the client-side CPU usage was com-
parable, and scales linearly with the number of records in
the database.
The bandwidth usage for the PIR lookup servers is sum-
marized in Figure 3. Server-side lookup communication
costs scale with the size of the database and the number of
users, specifically, in the long-term database, Θ(N
√
N ·Nfmax)
for DP5 and Θ(N
√
N ·Nrev) for MP3. Due to DP5’s scal-
ing relying on Nfmax, the bandwidth required to run an MP3
long-term lookup server is significantly less. This leads to
improvements on the order of 2 times less bandwidth for a
long-term lookup server with MP3 with N = 10000 users,
Nfmax = 100, and Nrev = 1, and this disparity grows even
more as both N and Nfmax increase. In the short-term, the
communication costs scale as Θ(N
√
N) for both protocols.
The bandwidth usage for the registration servers is sum-
marized in Figure 4. The communication costs in the long-
term scale as Θ(N ·Nfmax) for DP5 and Θ(N ·Nrev) for MP3.
It can be seen that MP3 results in improvements on the or-
der of 10 times less bandwidth for a long-term registration
server. Short-term communication costs scale as Θ(N) for
both protocols.
5. DISCUSSION
5.1 Scalability
A primary bottleneck in DP5 is its lack of scaling with
large number of users, specifically for long-term epochs. MP3
solves just that. The complexity for bandwidth usage of all
operations are summarized in Table 2.
The bulk of the cost in running a service such as MP3 or
DP5 comes from the bandwidth usage of the given protocol.
The bandwidth costs of MP3 are at most as expensive as
DP5, and often cheaper. Nrev is trivially always less than
or equal to Nfmax, and in reality, with a 24-hour long-term
epoch, setting Nrev = 1 or another small constant is very
reasonable6 making MP3 significantly cheaper during long-
term epochs, and thus addressing the scalability issue that
arose in DP5.
6Social networks such as Twitter disallow bulk unfollow-
ing [25], making our argument about setting Nrev to a
small/constant value even stronger.
5.2 Explicit Buddy Revocations
Unlike DP5, MP3’s revocation mechanism explicitly in-
forms the revoked buddy that they have been revoked. To
argue that DP5’s revocation mechanism is implicitly finger
printable, we analyzed the offline time of users on a popular
public Internet Relay Chat (IRC) channel. Although IRC is
not exactly a presence mechanism, it offers a good idea of
users’ online/offline statuses as a function of time.
We analyzed 6 months of IRC data7 on the #haskell chan-
nel on the Freenode IRC network from January 1st through
June 30th, 2016. Since our focus is presence, we recorded
when users join and quit. Often, a user would temporar-
ily disconnect without realizing, reconnect with a new nick-
name, and eventually change their nickname back to the
original. We took this period of time as a single user being
online for the entire duration and applied this correction in
our analysis. We also only gave each user a single vote in the
presence model as to not skew the result based on several
users joining and quitting relatively often.
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Figure 5: PMF of user offline time analyzed over
6 months on the #haskell channel on the Freenode
IRC network. Sample mean is 8.05 days.
Figure 5 plots the probability mass function of user offline
7http://tunes.org/˜nef/logs/haskell/
Table 2: The complexities for bandwidth usage comparing MP3 and DP5 as a function of N , Nfmax, and Nrev.
short-term long-term
Client Server Client Server
registration lookup registration lookup registration lookup registration lookup
MP3
Θ(1) Θ(
√
N) Θ(N) Θ(N
√
N)
Θ(Nrev) Θ(
√
N ·Nrev) Θ(N ·Nrev) Θ(N
√
N ·Nrev)
DP5 Θ(Nfmax) Θ(
√
N ·Nfmax) Θ(N ·Nfmax) Θ(N
√
N ·Nfmax)
time in days. By taking the upper bound of the confidence
interval for 99.9% confidence, we can say that the maximum
offline time for any given user is about 8.74 days. In the
context of DP5, this means that if you haven’t seen one
of your buddies come online after 9 long-term epochs, it is
highly probable that you have been revoked.
A more sophisticated analysis could be done in the context
of one’s own buddies using the knowledge of their behavior
and habits in the context of online presence. For example,
if you have a buddy that you know only comes on Wednes-
day mornings and Saturday evenings, you would sense an
anomaly with that particular friend had they not come on-
line after a certain number of weeks. Using this kind of logic,
a presence model of your own set of friends could be derived
based on their known habits.
It is also often the case that friend groups overlap, that is,
if A is friends with B and B is friends with C, it is highly
likely that A is friends with C. This means that if A has
any concern that B has revoked them, they can simply ask
C if B has been online recently.
These arguments show that the indistinguishability of of-
fline status and revocation in DP5 is unnecessary and the
explicit revocations of MP3 are not so much a drawback.
5.3 Malicious Parties
Some conventional approaches to ensure availability against
malicious parties cannot be applied directly to privacy-preserving
protocols, as they can leak information. This causes several
challenges: keeping the databases small, ensuring the reg-
istration server stores all uploaded presence records, ensur-
ing the lookup servers store all presence records and do not
modify them.
A malicious client could upload many presence records
during a given epoch, causing a denial of service (DoS) for all
other clients. If a malicious client were using an anonymous
channel, authentication would compromise the anonymity
of that client, defeating the purpose of MP3. To eliminate
this, k-times anonymous authentication schemes have been
proposed [26–29]. In these schemes, users are guaranteed
anonymity up to k times; that is, if a user authenticates k+1
times, the identity of the user can be computed. Another so-
lution is using n-time anonymous authentication [30]. Such
private rate-limiting schemes can be used to limit the num-
ber of times a client registers during a given epoch without
losing anonymity.
In the case that the registration server is dishonest and
drops records, a user could “friend themself” to ensure that
their presence records are being stored, by looking themself
up during every epoch. Note that all presence records are
indistinguishable, so the registration server can not target
specific records for dropping.
Lastly, in the case that the lookup servers are dishonest
and modify the database, Devet et al. propose a robust PIR
scheme [9] that allows detection of malicious servers. This
detection requires at least t+2 honest servers, where t is the
maximum number of servers allowed to collude to be able
to determine the data in a query. This robust PIR scheme
is implemented in MP3.
5.4 Cost Improvements
As stated in Section 5.1, the main component contribut-
ing to the cost of a service such as MP3 or DP5 comes from
the bandwidth usage, with the most expensive part being
a long-term lookup server. For N = 10000, Nfmax = 100,
and Nrev = 1, and assuming the arguments in Section 3.5.3,
the cost of running an MP3 long-term lookup server for one
month (30 days) is on the order of 400 GB of bandwidth and
the cost of running a DP5 long-term lookup server for one
month is on the order of 900 GB of bandwidth. This differ-
ence grows faster as N increases due to the Θ(N
√
N) scaling
(holding other parameters fixed) of a lookup server’s band-
width requirements. So MP3 provides a great improvement
to DP5’s long-term lookup.
MP3 has also greatly reduced the registration cost as com-
pared with DP5 due to registration messages growing with
Θ(Nrev) for MP3 and Θ(Nfmax) for DP5. This gives an im-
provement on the order of 10 times that of DP5 for 10000
users. This has less impact on the total cost of the service,
though, as registration costs for both protocols are on the
order of megabytes, while lookup costs are on the order of
gigabytes.
It should also be noted that Nfmax is on the order of N ,
while Nrev is on the order of a constant. This means that the
bandwidth costs of a long-term DP5 lookup server grow ap-
proximately as Θ(N2) while the bandwidth costs of a long-
term MP3 lookup server grow approximately as Θ(N
√
N).
6. CONCLUSION
We propose MP3, an efficient private presence protocol
that leaks no information about the graph structure of the
social network. We improved the existing DP5 private pres-
ence protocol while preserving the same level of privacy by
decreasing the overall bandwidth usage required of the ser-
vice.
We improved the most expensive part of DP5, the long-
term registration and lookup by leveraging a dynamic broad-
cast encryption scheme to keep long-term databases small,
allowing for cheap queries in both the long-term and short-
term. In reference to DP5, MP3 this requires on the order 10
times less bandwidth during long-term registration, and on
the order 2 times less bandwidth during long-term lookups
for 10000 users, and this difference only grows larger as the
number of users grows as the bandwidth costs scale with
Θ(N) for registration and Θ(N
√
N) for lookup.
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